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Abstract
Existing research has found an inverse relationship between urban density and the
degree of income inequality within metropolitan areas, suggesting that, as cities spread
out, they become increasingly segregated by income. This paper examines this hypoth-
esis using data covering more than 160000 block groups within 359 US metropolitan
areas over the years 1980, 1990, and 2000. The ﬁndings indicate that income inequality
- deﬁned by the variance of the log household income distribution - does indeed rise
signiﬁcantly as urban density declines. This increase, however, is associated with rising
inequality within block groups as cities spread out. The extent of income variation ex-
hibited between diﬀerent block groups, by contrast, shows virtually no association with
population density. There is, accordingly, little evidence that sprawl is systematically
associated with greater residential segregation of households by income.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D31, R11, R23
Keywords: Income Inequality, Urban Density, Sprawl
∗The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not represent the oﬃcial positions of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System.
11 Introduction
For much of the last century, population within the metropolitan areas of the United States
has shown a persistent tendency to move outward, leaving central cities for suburban locales.
Just within the last 50 years, this movement has been rather striking. In 1950, 41.5 percent
of metropolitan populations resided in suburban areas (i.e. those outside of central cities).
A half-century later, more than 62 percent did. The density of residential activity within
the nation’s urban areas has, as a consequence, changed dramatically. Between 1950 and
2000, the average central city population density decreased from 7517 residents per square
mile to 2716. At the same time, suburban densities rose from 175 residents per square mile
to 208.1
To be sure, the process of urban decentralizationlargely reﬂects the decisions of individu-
als and employers to spread out their activities increasingly over space. With improvements
in transportation technology and infrastructure, for example, it has become easier to com-
mute long distances. These changes have undoubtedly encouraged workers and ﬁrms to
locate on the outer fringes of their metropolitan areas where land tends to be both plentiful
and less costly.
In spite of the ‘voluntary’ nature of this process, however, urban decentralization has
generated a number of concerns about the welfare of metropolitan area populations. One
such concern is a rising disparity between neighborhoods, especially the decline of incomes in
central cities relativeto those of their suburban counterparts. As metropolitanareas expand,
the majority of both employment opportunities and relatively high-income households may
1All of these ﬁgures are derived from the US Census of Population and Housing, as reported by Hobbs
and Stoops (2002).
2shift from center to periphery, thereby creating a widening income gap between these two
areas. Over time, these diﬀerences may then become more pronounced as the poor become
increasingly isolated from productive interactions with wealthier neighbors.2
Existing research oﬀers evidence that seems to back this idea. Margo (1992), for ex-
ample, argues that the movement of metropolitan populations in the US toward suburban
locales over the latter half of the 20th century can be linked, to a signiﬁcant degree, to
the rise in personal incomes. As individual incomes rose, quite simply, so did the demand
for land. One rather straightforward implication of this hypothesis is that decentralization
should be accompanied by a rise in the extent of income segregation. After all, individuals
migrating to the suburbs (i.e. those with a particularly high demand for space) should also
be those with relatively high incomes. As a result, one would expect urban decentralization
to have led to the accumulation of high-income households on the outskirts of cities, while
poorer residents remain within the central cores.
A number of studies do suggest that, over this same time period, poverty became more
concentrated within the country’s urban areas. Mayer (1996), for example, reports that,
in 1964, families falling in the bottom quintile of the income distribution were 1.2 times as
likely to reside in a central city as wealthier families. By 1994, they were 1.4 times as likely
to reside in central cities. In studies of the country’s largest cities and metropolitan areas,
Kasarda (1993) and Abramson et al. (1995) ﬁnd that individuals living in poverty became
increasingly concentrated within poor neighborhoods (deﬁned by Census tracts) between
1970 and 1990. Although these two particular studies do not consider the issue of urban
2The movement of high income individuals away from the poor, for example, may leave the poor with
relatively few jobs (e.g. Kain (1968)) or reduce the extent to which the rich confer positive spillovers on the
poor (e.g. Wilson (1987) and Benabou (1996)).
3decentralization per se, the ﬁgures they document certainly characterize a period in which
metropolitan populations were shifting from central areas toward suburban ones.
Research on the spatial-mismatch hypothesis oﬀers a similar conclusion. This idea, ad-
vanced by Kain (1969), holds that inner-city dwellers tend to experience adverse economic
outcomes as population and employment leave those inner-cities because it becomes increas-
ingly diﬃcult for them to ﬁnd and sustain employment. One should therefore expect to
see the gap between the incomes earned by residents of suburban neighborhoods and those
earned by central city residents to rise as populations spread out. Many studies of this topic
have found that inner city minorities do seem to experience worse labor market outcomes,
usually measured by employment status and earnings, as economic activity leaves urban
centers, although the literature is far from unanimous on this point.3
On the speciﬁc topic of income inequality, Wheeler (2004) ﬁnds that urban density
exhibits a strong negative correlation with the degree of spread in the distribution of labor
earnings. Thus, as a metropolitan area’s population spreads out, its wage distribution tends
to widen. Although the results apply to white male workers with a strong attachment to the
labor force (and so do not oﬀer direct evidence on spatial mismatch, which tends to focus on
diﬀerences by race), they are certainly consistent with the idea that urban decentralization
leads to greater segregation of high-income and low-income workers across neighborhoods.
In spite of this existing work, however, surprisingly little research has directly studied
the evolution of inter-neighborhood income diﬀerentials as populations become increasingly
dispersed, particularly among neighborhoods deﬁned at levels ﬁner than central cities and
3See, for example, Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1989), Holzer (1991), and Weinberg (2000, 2004) for a discus-
sion of these issues.
4suburbs. This paper seeks to do so by examining the relationship between urban density and
the degree of income inequality both within and between neighborhoods deﬁned by Census
block groups. More speciﬁcally, I use data on household income to compute the variance
of the income distribution for each of 359 US metropolitan areas over the years 1980, 1990,
and 2000. I then exploit data covering more than 165000 block groups to decompose these
variances into components associated with the dispersion of incomes within block groups
and components associated with the dispersion across them.
The results suggest that, although the variance of a metropolitan area’s household in-
come distributionis indeed strongly, negatively associated withits overalldensity, the associ-
ation operates through a within-neighborhood channel rather than a between-neighborhood
channel. That is, as the population of a metropolitan area spreads out, household income
inequality increases largely because the extent of income variation among households within
the same block group rises, not because neighborhoods become more segregated by income.
Upon closer inspection, the data do reveal some evidence that decentralization tends
to be accompanied by rising between-neighborhood income gaps, but only at the top of
the block-group income distribution. Speciﬁcally, the income diﬀerential between the block
group at the 90th percentile of the household income distribution and the block group at
the median does increase signiﬁcantly as metropolitan areas decentralize. However, the gap
between the median and the block group at the 10th percentile tends to decrease, leaving
measures of the overall spread in the between-neighborhood income distribution relatively
unchanged. Moreover, there appears to be little association between density and either
the average income of the block group at the 90th percentile or that of the block group at
the 10th percentile. Similar results hold when the analysis is repeated using Census tracts
5instead of block groups.
It is important to note that these results should not be interpreted as suggesting that
certain neighborhoods do not suﬀer particularly adverse economic outcomes as populations
decentralize. There may very well be inner-city areas that become increasingly poor as
activity moves outward. However, the extent to which this process occurs evidently has
little eﬀect on the overall level of between-neighborhood income inequality in a metropolitan
area.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief
description of the data and some of the computational issues. Section 3 then presents the
results. Section 4 oﬀers some concluding comments.
2 Data and Measurement
The primary data source used for the analysis is the decennial US Census of Population and
Housing for the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 as compiled by GeoLytics.4 The GeoLytics data
ﬁles report a variety of demographic and economic characteristics (e.g. income, industry of
employment, age, race, gender, education, place of birth, employment-unemployment sta-
tus) for individuals at a variety of geographies, including counties, tracts, and block groups.
Unfortunately, individual-level observations are not reported in the data; only summary
measures taken across the individuals located within each geographic unit. This feature,
of course, limits the types of statistics that one can calculate. The primary advantage of
these data is the consistency of the geographic units - the data has been constructed based
on consistent geographic deﬁnitions over all three Census years.
4The data can be obtained from GeoLytics, Inc. at http://www.geolytics.com.
6For the present study, I focus on average household income and a variety of other
economic and demographic data among block groups, which I use as the basis for a ‘neigh-
borhood.’ Although neighborhoods could also be (and frequently are) deﬁned by Census
tracts, I focus on block groups in this paper because they represent the ﬁnest grouping
available in the data. Across the 359 metro areas in the sample, there are more than
165000 block groups which contained, on average, 526.5 households each and had a median
land area of approximately 0.33 square miles in the year 2000.5 Tracts tend to be larger
(1648.8 households, on average, and a median land area of 1.31 square miles in 2000) and,
therefore, may be less appropriate when considering neighborhoods, which are meant to
encompass areas over which individuals can reasonably be expected to interact with one
another. As demonstrated below, the principal ﬁndings are mostly invariant to the choice
of block groups or tracts.
I estimate the variance of a metropolitan area’s income distribution as follows. For
each year, the number of households with incomes falling into each of N closed intervals
is reported.6 I use these ﬁgures to compute the fraction of households with incomes less
5Metropolitan area deﬁnitions follow the Census Bureau’s deﬁnitions as of November, 2004. They were
accessed at http://www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/metrodef.html.
6For 1980, there are 15 categories: 0-4999, 5000-7499, 7500-9999, 10000-12499, 12500-14999, 15000-
17499, 17500-19999, 20000-22499, 22500-24999, 25000-27499, 27500-29999, 30000-34999, 35000-39999, 40000-
49999, 50000-74999. For 1990, there are 24: 0-4999, 5000-9999, 10000-12499, 12500-14999, 15000-17499,
17500-19999, 20000-22499, 22500-24999, 25000-27499, 27500-29999, 30000-32499, 32500-34999, 35000-37499,
37500-39999, 40000-42499, 42500-44999, 45000-47499, 47500-49999, 50000-54999, 55000-59999, 60000-74999,
75000-99999, 100000-124499, 125000-149999. For 2000, there are 15: 0-9999, 10000-14999, 15000-19999,
20000-24999, 25000-29999, 30000-34999, 35000-39999, 40000-44999, 45000-49999, 50000-59999, 60000-74999,
75000-99999, 100000-124999, 125000-149999, 150000-199999.
7than N distinct levels, which allows N quantiles of the household income distribution to be
estimated for each metro area. For example, if 14 percent of all households have income less
than 25000 dollars, I estimate the 0.14 quantile by 25000. Label these quantiles Xα.It h e n
match these N quantiles to their corresponding values from a normal (0,1) distribution.
Label these quantiles Uα. Assuming a lognormal household income distribution, Xα and
Uα are related as follows:
Xα =e x p ( ζ + Uασ)( 1 )
where ζ and σ are the mean and standard deviation parameters characterizing the lognormal
distribution (see Johnson and Kotz (1970, p. 117)). These parameters are readily obtained
by transforming (1) logarithmically and estimating by OLS. The ﬁt of these regressions
tended to be quite high in all cases. Across the 359 metro areas, the mean adjusted R2 was
approximately 0.98 for each year, and the minimum across all metro area-year observations
was 0.95. With the standard deviation, σ, the variance follows simply as σ2.
Summary statistics describing metropolitan area-level income variances appear in Table
1.7 Most notably, they demonstrate that, on average, the degree of dispersion exhibited by
metropolitan area-level (log) income distributions increased between 1980 and 2000, with
the majority of this increase taking place between 1980 and 1990. Over these two decades,
the mean income variance rose by a total of 10 log points, or approximately 18 percent.
Of this 10 log point increase, the vast majority, 9 log points, was experienced during the
7The magnitudes of these variances are very similar to what has been computed using individual-level
household income data. See, for example, http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/ie6.html.
81980s. Qualitatively, of course, this ﬁnding is consistent with what has now been widely
established in the inequality literature (e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992), Juhn et al. (1993)).
3 Empirical Findings
3.1 Urban Decentralization and Income Inequality
Consider ﬁrst the relationship between metropolitan area-level population density and the
extent of income inequality. To do so, let the variance of the (log) income distribution for
metropolitan area m in year t have the following characterization:
σ2
mt = µm + µt + βXmt + γDmt +  mt (2)
where µm is a metro area-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, µt is a year-speciﬁc term, Xmt is a vector
of covariates described in greater detail below, Dmt is the logarithm of population density,
and  mt is a residual. To eliminate the metro area ﬁxed eﬀects, I take 10-year diﬀerences of
equation (2), yielding
∆σ2
mt =∆ µt + β∆Xmt + γ∆Dmt +∆  mt (3)
which serves as the primary estimating equation in the analysis. Given the nature of the
diﬀerenced error term, there is non-zero correlation between the residuals for the same
metro area. The standard errors are adjusted to account for this correlation.
Density is calculated for each metropolitan area as the weighted average of county-
9level population densities, where the weights are given by each county’s share of total
metropolitan area population. This measure is used instead of average metropolitan area
density (calculated as the ratio of total metropolitan area population to total land area) to
mitigate the inﬂuence of extremely large but relatively unpopulated counties, which appear
in many metropolitan areas of the West. County-weighted population density gives these
counties less weight in the computations and, therefore, may provide a better sense of how
densely clustered a city’s population is.8 To provide a sense of what the resulting density
numbers look like, Table 2 lists the 10 most and least densely populated metropolitan areas
in each year.
Among the covariates included in the vector Xmt are some basic characteristics com-
monly associated with the degree of income inequality in an economy. These characteristics
include the percentages of the resident population that are black, female, foreign-born, un-
der the age of 25, and over the age of 65; the fraction of the population 25 years of age
or older that has completed at least a bachelor’s degree; shares of employment in 9 broad
industries9; the fraction of the labor force that is covered by a union; and the unemployment
rate. I also include three region dummies to account for any basic geographic diﬀerences in
the inequality trends across diﬀerent parts of the country.10
8I also repeated all of the estimation using weighted averages of block group-level population densities for
each metro area. The results were qualitatively similar to what is reported here.
9The sectors are manufacturing; agriculture, forestry, ﬁsheries, and mining; construction; wholesale trade;
retail trade; ﬁnance, insurance, real estate; public administration; education services; health services. I do
not use a more detailed industrial classiﬁcation scheme, in part, to avoid diﬃculties associated with the
change from the Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation system in 1980 and 1990 to the North American Industry
Classiﬁcation System in 2000.
10Since metropolitan area boundaries frequently cross state borders, and region deﬁnitions are based on
10Results appear in Table 3. In an eﬀort to gauge the robustness of the density-inequality
relationship, I consider three diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the covariates in the estimation of
equation (3). The ﬁrst limits the regressors to log density, the three region dummies, and
a time eﬀect for the 1980-1990 decade. The second then adds the population demographics
of each metro area (age, race, gender, education, foreign-born status). The third includes
the remainder of the covariates which provide a basic description of the metro area’s labor
market (industry employment shares, unionization, unemployment).11
Throughout, we see a number of fairly standard ﬁndings. Larger proportions of both
women and individuals under the age of 24 in the local population are strongly, positively
associated with inequality, which likely reﬂects the relatively low income that these indi-
viduals receive, on average. There is also some evidence, although not always statistically
signiﬁcant, that inequality rises with the percentages of foreign-born residents and individ-
uals over the age of 65 in the local population. Furthermore, inequality in a metro area
tends to rise signiﬁcantly as the unemployment rate increases, suggesting that households at
the bottom end of the income distribution are more sensitive economically to the business
cycle than wealthier households. Inequality is also signiﬁcantly, negatively associated with
the extent of union coverage in the local labor force, which is a relatively common ﬁnd-
ing. Although union workers typically receive an earnings premium over non-union labor,
states, some metro areas have parts in diﬀerent regions. I assign these multi-region metropolitan areas to
the regions in which the majority of their populations lie.
11The unionization rate for each metropolitan area is based upon state-level union coverage rates reported
by Hirsch et al. (2001) (available at www.unionstats.com). Metropolitan area-level union rates are calculated
as weighted averages of their constituent state-level rates, where the weights are given by the fraction of
each metro area’s labor force located in each state.
11union contracts tend to equalize earnings across workers (e.g. Fortin and Lemieux (1997)).
Shares of local employment in both manufacturing and construction, two sectors that are
frequently associated with relatively high earnings for relatively low-skill labor, correlate
negatively with income inequality.
The primary regressor of interest, the logarithm of population density, is uniformly
negative and statistically signiﬁcant across all three speciﬁcations. Based on the point
estimates, a 1 standard deviation decrease in the change in population density corresponds
to a 1 log point rise in the change in log income variance. This ﬁgure is far from negligible,
representing approximately 20 percent of the mean change in log income variance over the
two decades considered here. Again, this basic ﬁnding has already been established, at least
in a qualitative sense, in some of the work described above. In what follows, I take a closer
look at this result to determine the extent to which it reﬂects an increase in the degree of
income segregation across neighborhoods.
3.2 Decomposing Income Inequality
Consider the following standard decomposition of a metropolitan area’s income inequality.








(yh,n − ¯ y)2 (4)
where yh,n is the income of household h of neighborhood n,¯ y is the mean household income
for the entire metropolitan area, Hn is the total number of households in neighborhood n,
12N is the total number of neighborhoods, and H is the total number of households,

n Hn.12















(¯ yn − ¯ y)2 (5)
where ¯ yn represents the mean household income in neighborhood n. The ﬁrst of the terms
on the right-hand-side of (5) is the ‘within’ neighborhood component, which measures the
degree of income dispersion among households within the same neighborhood. The second
term, the ‘between’ component, captures the amount of income variation across diﬀerent
neighborhoods.
Because I do not have data from individual households, I am unable to compute the
within component directly. However, I can compute the between component. Using the
estimates of the variance, σ2, derived above, I construct the within-neighborhood component
as the diﬀerence between these two pieces.
A few summary statistics describing the within- and between-block group components
are reported in Table 1. Two features are immediately apparent. First, in each of the three
years considered (1980, 1990, 2000), the extent of income variation within neighborhoods is
considerably largerthan the extent of variationbetween them. In the year 2000,for instance,
the within-neighborhood component accounted for 80 percent of total metropolitan area
income variation, on average. This ﬁnding is roughly similar to what Epple and Sieg (1999)
12The average numbers of households per metropolitan area are relatively large: 180164.6 for 1980,
208780.9 for 1990, 240407.2 for 2000. Across all three years, the minimum number of households is 8681.
Hence, the diﬀerence between using a factor of
1
H in (4) instead of
1
H−1 is extremely small.
13report for municipalities in Boston and is consistent with the results of Ioannides (2004) and
Hardman and Ioannides (2004), who document a substantial degree of income heterogeneity
within small residential clusters in the US. Second, between 1980 and 1990, there was a
sharp rise in the proportion of total income variation attributable to between-neighborhood
diﬀerences. Over this decade, the average fraction of total income variation associated with
diﬀerences across neighborhoods rose from 12.7 percent to 21.9 percent. Hence, although
income variation remained predominantly a within-neighborhood phenomenon in 2000, the
between-neighborhood component became increasingly important between 1980 and 2000.
3.3 Decentralization and Inequality: Within vs. Between Neighborhoods
To determine whether urban decentralization is associated with growing inequality through
a within- or a between-neighborhood channel (or possibly both), I estimate a series of re-
gressions following the procedure above. That is, I estimate three speciﬁcations of equation
(3) in which the dependent variables are the changes in within- and between-neighborhood
income variation rather than the change in the total variance of log income.
The estimates are reported in Table 4. Interestingly, they demonstrate some striking
diﬀerences in the estimated associations across the two sets of results. Looking just at
the longest speciﬁcation, III, the change in a metro area’s degree of income variation
within its block groups is positively and signiﬁcantly tied to changes in the fraction of
the population with a bachelor’s degree, the fraction that is black, and the fraction that
is foreign-born. On the other hand, increases in the percentages of total employment in
manufacturing and ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate correlate negatively with inequality
within neighborhoods.
14When considering between-neighborhood inequality, there is a similar positive and sig-
niﬁcant association with the fraction of college graduates in the local population, but also
with a number of quantities that did not relate signiﬁcantly to within-block group inequality:
the percentages of the population accounted for by women and individuals under the age of
24 and the unemployment rate. Increases in these three variables tend to be associated with
increases in the extent of income variation between diﬀerent block groups. Additionally,
between-neighborhood inequality is signiﬁcantly, negatively tied to the fraction of the local
population that is black, the shares of total employment accounted for by construction and
education services, and the extent of union coverage in the local labor force.
Why do we see such diﬀerences in the associations of these variables with the two mea-
sures of inequality? One possible explanation relates to how residential patterns change with
each quantity. Increases in the fraction of blacks in a metro area’s total population, for in-
stance, may be associated with increasing racial heterogeneity within block groups (hence,
higher within-neighborhood income variation), and as a consequence, declining heterogene-
ity between them (thus, lower between-neighborhood variation). Similarly, ﬂuctuations in
unemployment and union coverage may inﬂuence workers in particular neighborhoods much
more so than a city’s general population. This would lead to ﬂuctuations in the degree of
inequality between neighborhoods rather than within them.
As for the variable of primary interest, population density, the results demonstrate a
clear, negative association with the extent of income variation within neighborhoods. As
the change in population density decreases by 1 standard deviation in the cross section, the
change in (log) income variance within block groups rises by approximately 1 percentage
point. This magnitude, recall, is virtually identical to the one estimated for overall income
15variation.
Given this ﬁnding, it is perhaps not surprising that the estimated association between
density and between-neighborhood inequality is extremely small. None of the three spec-
iﬁcations produces a statistically or economically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the change in
population density. Based on these results, then, there is little evidence that urban de-
centralization is associated with rising income diﬀerentials between neighborhoods. The
negative association between density and the variance of household income observed in
Table 3 seems to be driven almost entirely by the change in within-neighborhood income
diﬀerences.
3.4 Instrumental Variables Estimates
One obvious criticism of the estimation above is the potential endogeneity of changes in
density with respect to changes in inequality. A rise in the degree of income dispersion
in a metro area, for example, may induce residents to segregate further, possibly leading
to greater decentralization. It is not implausible that high-income households may seek to
move farther away from low-income households as the gap between the two rises.13
To address this matter, I turn to instrumental variables (IV) estimation, where I con-
sider two diﬀerent sets of instruments for the change in density: (i) the lagged level of
density within a metropolitan area and (ii) lagged shares of employment in each of the
nine industry shares considered above. The rationale for each is straightforward. Initial
density should capture a city’s capacity for increased levels of density over time. All else
13Rising income diﬀerentials, for example, may generate greater diﬀerences in the demand for certain local
public goods or an increasing desire to avoid ‘negative’ neighborhood eﬀects.
16equal, initially dense cities should be less likely to see further increases in their densities
because they face greater constraints on space.14 Because diﬀerent types of employers have
diﬀerent propensities to decentralize their operations (e.g. Glaeser and Kahn (2004)), initial
industry shares should also predict future changes in population density. Weinberg (2004),
for example, has exploited this feature of industry location patterns to instrument for job
centralization in a study of spatial mismatch. Of course, because some may be concerned
that initial density or sectoral employment shares are correlated with unobserved factors
inﬂuencing subsequent changes in inequality (e.g. density or the manufacturing share in
1990 may be endogenous with respect to the change in inequality between 1990 and 2000), I
use density and each industry share in 1980 to instrument for the change in density between
1990 and 2000.15
Results using all three inequality measures and all three speciﬁcations appear in Table
5. For the sake of conciseness, I have only reported the coeﬃcients on the change in density.
What they show, for the most part, is very similar to what the estimates in Tables 3 and
4 demonstrate. Density and inequality are negatively related, and the association oper-
ates primarily through a within-neighborhood channel rather than a between-neighborhood
channel.
14There is, in fact, a strong negative connection between the initial level of density in a metro area and the
extent to which it decentralizes over the next 10 years. A simple regression of the change in density on its
initial level in the data used here produces a coeﬃcient (standard error) of -0.04 (0.004) with a goodness-of-ﬁt
statistic equal to 0.14.
15As demonstrated by the results from F-tests of marginal signiﬁcance reported in Table 5, both sets of
instruments are signiﬁcant predictors of the change in density between 1990 and 2000.
173.5 Other Measures of Between-Neighborhood Inequality
In this section, I expand on the analysis of between-neighborhood inequality by considering
how changes in metropolitan area density inﬂuence some alternative measures of income
diﬀerences across block groups. In particular, I explore how diﬀerences between the 90th,
50th, and 10th percentiles of the block group (average) household income distributionwithin
each metropolitan area change as metropolitan areas decentralize.16
Results from the same three speciﬁcations considered above, each of which is estimated
by both OLS and IV, appear in Table 6.17 Regardless of whether the percentiles are
computed in a weighted or unweighted fashion (where the weights are given by the number
of households in each block group), the estimated coeﬃcients on density are quite similar.
The OLS results suggest that, instead of decreases in density generating greater inequality
between neighborhoods, they may generate smaller inter-neighborhood income diﬀerences.
A diﬀerent set of conclusions emerges from the instrumental variables estimates. These
suggest that there appears to be littleassociationbetween density and the diﬀerence between
the neighborhoods at the 90th and 10th percentiles of the log income distribution, which is
consistent with the results examining the between-neighborhood component of total income
variationdocumented above. When broken down into 90-50and 50-10 diﬀerentials,however,
we see that the diﬀerence between the 90th percentile and the median tends to increase
signiﬁcantly as cities decentralize. At the same time, the diﬀerence between the median
and the 10th percentile appears to decrease as metro area population spreads out. Indeed,
the estimated associations between density and the 50-10 gap are signiﬁcantly positive when
16On average, metropolitan areas in the sample contain 460 block groups each (minimum = 27, maximum
= 14019), so calculating percentiles is a reasonable exercise with these data.
17Recall, standard errors are, in all cases, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-metro area correlation.
18initial density is used as an instrument for its future change. When combined, of course,
these two observations are perfectly compatible with the ﬁnding that the 90-10 diﬀerential
shows little association with changes in density.
This evidence suggests that, although there seems to be little association between ur-
ban decentralization and measures of the overall degree of income variation across diﬀerent
neighborhoods, the same is not true for all parts of the income distribution. As city popu-
lations spread out, there appears to be an increase in the average incomes of neighborhoods
at the top relative to the middle. Particularly high-income households may segregate them-
selves to a larger extent as populations spread out. On the other hand, the gap between the
average incomes at the middle of the distribution and those at the bottom shrinks, which
may reﬂect greater income mixing among middle to lower income households.
A more detailed set of results describing these associations appears in Table 7, which
reports the coeﬃcients on the change in density in regressions in which these three individual
quantiles are speciﬁed as the dependent variables. The OLS results, once again, suggest
that declining density may lead to smaller income diﬀerences between block groups because
the estimated associations are positive and increasing as one moves from the 10th percentile
to the 90th. Hence, decreases in density ought to reduce the average income at the top of
the block group distribution by more than it does at either the middle or the bottom.
The instrumental variables estimates, on the other hand, indicate that the 90th and 10th
percentiles of the block group income distribution vary little with population density. Only
two of the 24 estimates for these two quantiles diﬀer statistically from zero. This result is
interesting because it suggests that urban decentralization is not associated with the top of
the neighborhood income distribution pulling away from the rest of the distribution. It is
19also not associated with the bottom of the distribution falling farther behind the remainder
of the distribution. The median, however, does show signiﬁcantly positive variation with
density in most instances, suggesting that urban decentralization may be associated with a
decline in the incomes of neighborhoods at the middle of the distribution. This result, of
course, explains why the gap between the top of the income distribution rises while the gap
at the bottom falls.
3.6 Inequality Within and Between Tracts
While the basic geographic unit of analysis in this paper is the block group, many existing
studies of neighborhood-level economic outcomes have typically focused on Census tracts,
which, represent a larger geographic area. Recall, the median Census tract consists of
approximately 1649 households and covers roughly 1.3 square miles, as opposed to 526
households and 0.33 square miles for block groups. Given the prevalence of tract-level
analyses in the literature on neighborhood outcomes, this section considers whether the
deﬁnition of neighborhoods as tracts, rather than block groups, alters the results in any
substantive way.18
The results are summarized in Table 8 which reports the coeﬃcients on the change
in log density from every speciﬁcation considered using block group-level observations. In
general, the tract-levelresults yield very similarconclusions. The extent of income inequality
observed within tracts shows a strong, negative association with population density, whereas
between-tract inequality shows little correlation with density.
18On average, metropolitan areas in the sample contain 147 tracts each (minimum = 10, maximum =
4507).
20Looking at the percentile diﬀerences, the OLS results again suggest that, if anything,
urban decentralization may be associated with smaller between-neighborhood gaps, not
larger. The IV estimates are mostly insigniﬁcant, although there is, once again, some
evidence that the gap between the top and middle of the neighborhood income distribution
widens somewhat as density declines. As noted above, this ﬁnding seems to reﬂect a decrease
in the median relative to the 90th percentile, which could be the product of greater mixing
of medium- and low-income households in suburban neighborhoods.
Just as with block groups, then, urban decentralization tends to be accompanied by
widening income gaps within Census tracts. There is little evidence that sprawling cities
see their between-neighborhood income gaps rise.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Cities in the United States have seen their populations decentralize for more than a century.
Although the process has largely been driven by the decisions of individuals to live farther
and farther away from historical city centers, it has generated a number of concerns about
the segregation of households by income. Given the evidence documented both here and in
previous work that urban decentralization tends to be accompanied by signiﬁcant increases
in income inequality, these concerns certainly seem warranted.
This paper has examined this issue further by exploring the extent to which the rise in
inequality with decreasing density emanates from a rise in the degree of income variation
exhibited across diﬀerent neighborhoods. In general, the ﬁndings suggest that between-
neighborhood income gaps do not rise signiﬁcantly as cities spread out. Neither the diﬀer-
ence between the 90th and 10th percentiles of the block group-level income distribution,
21nor the degree of variation associated with between-block group income diﬀerentials, rises
(or falls) signiﬁcantly as a metropolitan area’s population spreads out. This result, once
again, should not be interpreted as suggesting that all between-neighborhood income dif-
ferentials are completely invariant to the outward movement of people in a city. There may
still be a rising gap between the absolute poorest neighborhoods and the remainder of the
metropolitan area. However, the extent to which this potential gap contributes to overall
income inequality within a local market appears decidedly small.
Instead, the rise of income dispersion as cities decentralize is largely associated with an
increase in the degree of income heterogeneity within neighborhoods. One straightforward
interpretation of this result is that urban decentralization is associated with greater income
mixing within neighborhoods, regardless of whether they are deﬁned by block groups or
tracts. Because they are less densely populated, for instance, suburban neighborhoods may
more readily accommodate households with widely varying income levels than central cities,
where individuals reside in greater proximity to one another. This may be similar to the
ﬁnding reported by Glaeser and Kahn (2004) that suburbs are more racially integrated than
central cities.
What remains unresolved, unfortunately, is why overall inequality rises with urban de-
centralization. If sprawling cities were simply reorganizing their populations from dense,
segregated collections of neighborhoods into less dense, heterogeneous sets of neighbor-
hoods, the rise in within-neighborhood inequality should be oﬀset by a drop in between-
neighborhood inequality. The data show little evidence of any such drop.
One possible explanation is that urban decentralization may be associated with greater
industrial heterogeneity (beyond what the analysis here controls for), at least in the sense
22that suburban areas might have large numbers of particularly low-wage jobs, high-wage
jobs, or both. A large presence of jobs in typically low-wage sectors such as food services
and accommodation or retail trade, for example, may contribute to higher inequality within
neighborhoods. On a more speculative level, less dense suburban areas might be character-
ized by fewer social interactions among individuals of diﬀerent groups, as deﬁned by income
or education. That is, although suburban neighborhoods may have a more heterogeneous
mix of residents, the extent of productive interaction among them may be relatively low.
Following Glaeser (1999), this may lead to greater income inequality as ‘less-skilled’ workers
have fewer opportunities to learn from their ‘more-skilled’ counterparts.
Both explanations are, at this point, purely hypothetical and, therefore, require greater
research. Given the relative dearth of studies of the inequality-urban decentralization issue,
such research certainly seems worthwhile.
23Table 1: Summary Statistics - Block Group Income Inequality
Year Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
1980 Variance 0.55 0.06 0.43 0.75
Within Component 0.47 0.05 0.37 0.64
Between Component 0.07 0.04 0.003 0.24
1990 Variance 0.64 0.07 0.48 0.94
Within Component 0.5 0.05 0.39 0.65
Between Component 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.31
2000 Variance 0.65 0.08 0.48 1.05
Within Component 0.52 0.05 0.41 0.7
Between Component 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.38
Note: Statistics taken across 359 metropolitan areas.
24Table 2: Most and Least Densely Populated Metro Areas
Year Top 10 Density Bottom 10 Density
1980 New York-Northern New Jersey- 14740 Flagstaﬀ, AZ 4.03
Long Island, NY-NJ-PA
Philadelpha-Camden- 4927 Prescott, AZ 8.4
Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD
Washington-Arlington- 4374.1 St. George, UT 10.7
Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV
Baltimore-Towson, MD 4017.3 Casper, WY 13.5
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 3996.1 Wenatchee, WA 14.3
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 3959.4 Farmington, NM 14.8
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 2930.6 Yuma, AZ 16.4
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 2885.7 Bend, OR 20.6
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 2556.5 Rapid City, SD 20.9
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 2435.9 El Centro, CA 22.1
1990 New York-Northern New Jersey- 15161.5 Flagstaﬀ, AZ 5.2
Long Island, NY-NJ-PA
Philadelphia-Camden- 4385.6 Casper, WY 11.5
Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 4171.9 Prescott, AZ 13.3
Washington-Arlington- 3886.3 Farmington, NM 16.6
Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 3783.4 Wenatchee, WA 16.7
Baltimore-Towson, MD 3440.1 Yuma, AZ 19.4
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 2942.5 St. George, UT 20
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 2806.9 Rapid City, SD 24.4
Los Angeles-Long Beach- 2369 Bend, OR 24.8
Santa Ana, CA
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 2292.3 El Centro, CA 26.2
2000 New York-Northern New Jersey- 16125 Flagstaﬀ, AZ 6.2
Long Island, NY-NJ-PA
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 4419.8 Casper, WY 12.5
Philadelphia-Camden- 4027.1 Prescott, AZ 20.6
Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 3880 Farmington, NM 20.6
Washington-Arlington- 3573.1 Wenatchee, WA 21.2
Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 3036.4 Rapid City, SD 26.5
Baltimore-Towson, MD 2813 Yuma, AZ 29
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 2634.7 Great Falls, MT 29.8
Los Angeles-Long Beach- 2634.6 Cheyenne, WY 30.4
Santa Ana, CA
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 2231.9 Duluth, MN-WI 32.9
Note: Populationdensities are calculated as (population-share) weightedaverages of county-
level densities (in residents per square mile).
25Table 3: Overall Inequality Results
Variable I II III
Log Density -0.07* -0.086* -0.07*
(0.009) (0.01) (0.01)
% Bachelor’s Degree – 0.54* 0.52*
(0.08) (0.09)
% Female – 0.73* 0.44*
(0.28) (0.25)
% Black – 0.05 0.03
(0.11) (0.1)
% Under 24 Years – 0.35* 0.23*
(0.14) (0.13)
% Over 65 Years – 0.31* 0.23
(0.16) (0.15)
% Foreign-Born – 0.28* 0.2
(0.13) (0.13)
% Manufacturing – – -0.35*
(0.07)
% Ag., For., Fish., Min. – – -0.04
(0.11)
% Construction – – -0.28*
(0.12)
% Wholesale Trade – – -0.1
(0.15)
% Retail Trade – – 0.11
(0.11)
% FIRE – – -0.46*
(0.15)
% Public Administration – – -0.34*
(0.14)
% Education Services – – -0.28*
(0.13)
% Health Services – – 0.11
(0.13)
Unemployment Rate – – 0.46*
(0.08)
% Union Coverage – – -0.12*
(0.05)
R2 0.64 0.69 0.74
Note: 718 observations. Dependent variable is the change in the variance of the log income
distribution for a metropolitan area. Each regressor is expressed in terms of contemporane-
ous 10-year changes. All speciﬁcations also include 3 region dummies and a time eﬀect for
the 1980-90 decade. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are adjusted for both het-
eroskedasticity and within-metro area correlation of the regression error terms. An asterisk
(*) denotes signiﬁcance at 10 percent or better.
26Table 4: Within- and Between-Neighborhood Inequality Results
Within-Neighborhood Between-Neighborhood
Variable I II III I II III
Log Density -0.069* -0.075* -0.064* -0.001 -0.01 -0.006
(0.009) (0.01) (0.01) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
% Bachelor’s Degree – 0.38* 0.35* – 0.16* 0.17*
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
% Female – -0.006 -0.004 – 0.73* 0.44*
(0.21) (0.23) (0.2) (0.17)
% Black – 0.24* 0.24* – -0.19* -0.21*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.1) (0.1)
% Under 24 Years – 0.1 0.06 – 0.25* 0.17*
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
% Over 65 Years – 0.37* 0.22 – -0.06 0.01
(0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15)
% Foreign-Born – 0.21* 0.18* – 0.07 0.024
(0.1) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06)
% Manufacturing – – -0.27* –– - 0 . 0 8
(0.07) (0.05)
% Ag., For., Fish., Min. – – -0.13 – – 0.09
(0.12) (0.11)
% Construction – – 0.035 – – -0.32*
(0.12) (0.1)
% Wholesale Trade – – 0.1 –– - 0 . 1 9
(0.17) (0.15)
% Retail Trade – – 0.03 – – 0.08
(0.1) (0.09)
% FIRE – – -0.26* –– - 0 . 2
(0.14) (0.13)
% Public Administration – – -0.18 –– - 0 . 1 6
(0.13) (0.1)
% Education Services – – 0.12 – – -0.39*
(0.15) (0.14)
% Health Services – – 0.02 – – 0.09
(0.13) (0.11)
Unemployment Rate – – 0.02 – – 0.44*
(0.09) (0.09)
% Union Coverage – – 0.01 – – -0.13*
(0.05) (0.05)
R2 0.17 0.23 0.28 0.66 0.68 0.72
Note: 718 observations. Dependent variables are the changes in within- and between-
neighborhood income variation for a metropolitan area. Each regressor is expressed in terms
of contemporaneous 10-year changes. All speciﬁcations also include 3 region dummies and
a time eﬀect for the 1980-90 decade. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are adjusted
for both heteroskedasticity and within-metro area correlation of the regression error terms.
An asterisk (*) denotes signiﬁcance at 10 percent or better.
27Table 5: Instrumental Variables Estimates
IV - Density IV - Industry Shares
Dependent Variable I II III I II III
Variance of -0.24* -0.1* -0.04 -0.07 -0.1* -0.04
Log Income Distribution (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Within-Neighborhood -0.2* -0.11* -0.066* -0.07 -0.1* -0.07*
Inequality Component (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Between-Neighborhood -0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.003 0.001 0.03
Inequality Component (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
F-test 40.2 95.1 88.03 5.26 9.79 8.72
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Note: 359 observations. Coeﬃcients on the change in log population density. Dependent
variables are the changes in the variance, the within-neighborhood component, and the
between-neighborhood component between 1990 and 2000. Instruments are log density or
industry employment shares in 1980. Speciﬁcations follow what is reported in Tables 3
and 4. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are adjusted for both heteroskedasticity
and within-metro area correlation of the regression error terms. An asterisk (*) denotes
signiﬁcance at 10 percent or better. “F-test” reports results from test of the (marginal) sig-
niﬁcance of the instruments from the ﬁrst stage regression for the appropriate speciﬁcation
(p-value under null that the IV coeﬃcients are zero appears in parentheses).
28Table 6: Alternative Measures of Between-Neighborhood Inequality
OLS IV - Density IV - Industry Shares
Dep. Var. I II III I II III I II III
Unweighted 0.04 0.07* 0.1* -0.3* -0.055 0.06 -0.23 -0.2 -0.07
90-10 Diﬀ. (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.15) (0.1) (0.11) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13)
Unweighted 0.02 0.035 0.06* -0.41* -0.2* -0.13* -0.23* -0.24* -0.15*
90-50 Diﬀ. (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.1) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08)
Unweighted 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.14* 0.19* -0.01 0.04 0.07
50-10 Diﬀ. (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.1) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.1)
Weighted 0.05 0.067* 0.09* -0.35* -0.07 0.01 -0.08 -0.14 0.002
90-10 Diﬀ. (0.04) (0.04) (0.036) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13)
Weighted 0.02 0.027 0.06* -0.4* -0.19* -0.16* -0.1 -0.17* -0.09
90-50 Diﬀ. (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.1) (0.06) (0.07) (0.1) (0.08) (0.08)
Weighted 0.03 0.04* 0.03 0.06 0.12* 0.17* 0.01 0.03 0.09
50-10 Diﬀ. (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.1) (0.06) (0.07) (0.1) (0.08) (0.08)
Note: Coeﬃcients on the change in log population density. Standard errors, reported in
parentheses, are adjusted for both heteroskedasticity and within-metro area correlation of
the regression error terms. Speciﬁcations follow what is reported in Tables 3 and 4. An
asterisk (*) denotes signiﬁcance at 10 percent or better.
29Table 7: Individual Quantile Results
OLS IV - Density IV - Industry Shares
Dep. Var. I II III I II III I II III
Unweighted 0.26* 0.21* 0.17* -0.18 0.01 0.02 -0.08 -0.02 0.01
90th Perc. (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08)
Unweighted 0.24* 0.17* 0.1* 0.23* 0.21* 0.15* 0.15* 0.23* 0.16*
50th Perc. (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Unweighted 0.22* 0.14* 0.07* 0.13 0.07 -0.05 0.16 0.19* 0.09
10th Perc. (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.1) (0.1)
Weighted 0.27* 0.2* 0.16* -0.28* -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
90th Perc. (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08)
Weighted 0.24* 0.17* 0.1* 0.13 0.18* 0.12* 0.08 0.15* 0.08
50th Perc. (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
Weighted 0.21* 0.13* 0.066* 0.07 0.06 -0.05 0.07 0.12 -0.01
10th Perc. (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09)
Note: Coeﬃcients on the change in log population density. Standard errors, reported in
parentheses, are adjusted for both heteroskedasticity and within-metro area correlation of
the regression error terms. Speciﬁcations follow what is reported in Tables 3 and 4. An
asterisk (*) denotes signiﬁcance at 10 percent or better.
30Table 8: Tract-Level Results
OLS IV - Density IV - Industry Shares
Dep. Var. I II III I II III I II III
Within -0.07* -0.08* -0.07* -0.21* -0.11* -0.06* -0.08 -0.1* -0.06*
Component (0.009) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Between -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.03 0.009 0.02 0.005 0.002 0.02
Component (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Unweighted 0.037 0.067 0.08* -0.17 -0.0002 0.05 -0.24 -0.26* -0.25
90-10 Diﬀ. (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.15) (0.11) (0.12) (0.19) (0.15) (0.17)
Unweighted 0.05 0.05 0.07* -0.26* -0.09 -0.11 -0.17 -0.18* -0.15
90-50 Diﬀ. (0.03) (0.03) (0.036) (0.1) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.1) (0.1)
Unweighted -0.01 0.01 0.007 0.1 0.09 0.16 -0.07 -0.08 -0.1
50-10 Diﬀ. (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.09) (0.1) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13)
Weighted 0.04 0.056 0.09* -0.3* -0.09 -0.05 -0.27 -0.27* -0.17
90-10 Diﬀ. (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.17) (0.12) (0.14) (0.18) (0.15) (0.16)
Weighted 0.05 0.05 0.08* -0.27* -0.11 -0.08 -0.25* -0.25* -0.21*
90-50 Diﬀ. (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.1) (0.11) (0.15) (0.12) (0.13)
Weighted -0.01 0.005 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.04
50-10 Diﬀ. (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.08) (0.1) (0.12) (0.1) (0.11)
Unweighted 0.3* 0.24* 0.19* -0.05 0.1 0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.04
90th Perc. (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) (0.1) (0.1)
Unweighted 0.25* 0.18* 0.11* 0.21* 0.19* 0.12* 0.12 0.2* 0.1*
50th Perc. (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Unweighted 0.26* 0.17* 0.11* 0.12 0.1 -0.04 0.19 0.28* 0.21*
10th Perc. (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12)
Weighted 0.27* 0.2* 0.17* -0.15 0.03 -0.01 -0.14 -0.09 -0.11
90th Perc. (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.13) (0.09) (0.1) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12)
Weighted 0.23* 0.15* 0.08* 0.12 0.14* 0.07 0.11 0.16* 0.1*
50th Perc. (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
Weighted 0.23* 0.15* 0.07* 0.15 0.12 0.05 0.13 0.17* 0.07
10th Perc. (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.08) (0.1) (0.11) (0.1) (0.11)
Note: Coeﬃcients on the change in log population density. Standard errors, reported in
parentheses, are adjusted for both heteroskedasticity and within-metro area correlation of
the regression error terms. Speciﬁcations follow what is reported in Tables 3 and 4. An
asterisk (*) denotes signiﬁcance at 10 percent or better.
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